The economics of cultural formation of preferences by Pichler, Michael
Institute of
Mathematical
Economics
Working Papers
431
April 2010
The Economics of Cultural Formation of
Preferences
Michael M. Pichler
IMW · Bielefeld University
Postfach 100131
33501 Bielefeld · Germany
email: imw@wiwi.uni-bielefeld.de
http://www.wiwi.uni-bielefeld.de/˜imw/Papers/showpaper.php?431
ISSN: 0931-6558
The Economics of Cultural Formation of
Preferences
Michael M. Pichler∗
IMW, Bielefeld University, Universita¨tsstr. 25, D–33615 Bielefeld
Tel.: +49 521 106 4902, Fax: +49 521 106 2997
mpichler@uni–bielefeld.de
and
eri–ces, University of Valencia
April 2010 (First Draft)
Abstract
This paper introduces a generalized representation of the forma-
tion of continuous preferences (which can reflect different intensities).
The preference intensity that a child adopts is formed as the collective
outcome of all role models for preference intensities — which are de-
rived from the socioeconomic actions of adults — that it socially learns
from. We then show how the adopted preference intensities induce
preferences over socioeconomic choices. Finally, this cultural forma-
tion of preferences process is endogenized as resulting out of optimal
parental socialization decisions. This framework thus endogenously de-
termines the intergenerational evolution of preference intensities and
the induced preferences.
Keywords: Socialization; Preference Evolution; Endogenous Prefer-
ences; Cultural transmission
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1 Introduction
The concept of preferences is one of the most important cornerstones of
economic theory, since preferences provide economic agents with the nec-
essary means to choose between different possible socio–economic actions.
The question of how preferences are being formed is thus of central interest
to economic theory. The aim of the present paper is to contribute to the
resolution of this question by providing a general framework that represents
the formation of continuous preferences.
With the latter, we mean those types of preferences that can reflect
different intensities (or magnitudes, valuations, strengths, importances. . . ),
located in a convex subset of the real line. Notably, this characterization is
not very restrictive since, assumingly, most types of preferences can be (re–
)interpreted in a continuous way (e.g. instead of asking whether a person has
a ‘status preference’, one can ask how important status is for the person).
Specifically, it contains preference types that are in standard use in economic
theory, like the degree of altruism, the intensity of preferences for leisure or
for social status, the patience (intensity), etc.; but notably, it also contains
continuous cultural traits and concepts like the values, attitudes, (strength
of) norms and ‘continuous opinions’ that a person adopts.
A natural question that arises in the context of this characterization
of continuous preferences is then which of the possible intensities a person
adopts, and how a process that determines this can be described in formal
terms. Our approach will be to let the preference intensities be formed in
the socialization period of a person, out of social learning from role models
for preference intensities1. This latter concept has substance, since we de-
rive it from the observable socio–economic actions of the adults. Given the
preference intensity that a person has adopted at the beginning of its adult
period, we show how this can be interpreted such as to induce preferences
over the choices over the role models for preference intensities, thus the un-
derlying socio–economic actions. The central importance of this step is that
it closes the circle between the socio–economic actions taken by one adult
generation and the preferences over these actions by the succeeding adult
generation. We thus obtain a fully consistent and closed representation of
the evolution (!) of the preference intensities and the induced preferences of
a sequence of generations.
Related Literature By basing the formation of preferences process on
the children’s social learning, the approach of the present paper stands in
a natural relation to the literature on the economics of cultural transmis-
1Our viewpoint will be primarily that of an economist, with references to findings in
the socio–psychological literature on child socialization whenever needed. A thorough
placement of the present paper within this literature is though far beyond scope. See e.g.
Grusec and Hastings [29] and Grusec and Kuczynski [30] for related book long treatments.
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sion2. This literature has been established by Bisin and Verdier [7, 8, 9]
and Bisin et al. [6], and is based on the work of Cavalli-Sforza and Feld-
man [15, 16] and Boyd and Richerson [12] in evolutionary anthropology. It
studies the population dynamics of the distribution of a discrete set of pref-
erences (respectively cultural traits) under an endogenous intergenerational
cultural transmission mechanism. The endogeneity stems from the purpose-
ful parental choice of socialization intensity, which effectively determines the
probability that the child will directly adopt the preferences of the parents.
Parents engage into the cost of purposeful socialization in order to avoid
(decrease the probability) that their child will not adopt their preferences
— in which case parents encounter subjective utility losses3.
However (as the name reveals), this theory considers the probabilistic
transmission of preferences and does not approach the formation of the lat-
ter, restricting its applicability mainly to discrete preferences (respectively
cultural traits). So far, little has been contributed to resolve the question
of the cultural formation of continuous preferences. Important early treat-
ments of the topic are Cavalli-Sforza and Feldman [16] in a theoretical, and
Otto et al. [35] in an empirical context. More recently, both Bisin and Topa
[5] and Panebianco [36] proposed representations of the formation of a pref-
erence intensity (respectively value of a cultural trait) as a weighted average
between a role model that is taken by the family and the (weighted) average
of the preference intensity in the population.
In this respect, the major limitation of both contributions is, however,
that they do not explicitly consider the family’s choice of role models (and
also not the construction of role models themselves), but do (implicitly)
assume that the family always chooses their ‘target value’, i.e. the opti-
mal preference intensity, as a role model (Bisin and Topa [5]), respectively
that the parent chooses a role model that is exactly in accordance with its
preference intensity (Panebianco [36]). Given this degenerate view on the
family’s behavioral choices, the family’s socialization decision is then re-
stricted to choosing its weight in the formation of the preference intensity
of their child.
2As Bisin and Verdier [7, p. 299] point out, this approach is thus distinct from models
that are based on evolutionary selection mechanisms (where preferences/traits are either
genetically inherited or imitated, with the reproductive/‘imitative’ success being increas-
ing in the material payoff of the different preferences/traits), like Rogers [41], Bester and
Gu¨th [4], Fershtman and Weiss [21], Kockesen et al. [32], [24], and from models that deal
with the agents’ introspective self selection of preferences, as in e.g. Becker [2] and Becker
and Mulligan [3].
3The properties of the model framework have been applied in several different contexts,
such as e.g. preferences for social status (Bisin and Verdier [7]), voting and political
ideology (Bisin and Verdier [8]), corruption (Hauk and Sa´ez-Mart´ı [31]), hold up problems
(Olcina and Penarrubia [34]), gender discrimination (Escriche et al. [20]), etc. For an
overview over the literature on cultural transmission see Bisin and Verdier [10].
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Contributions The present paper adds to this literature in a substan-
tial way. In a first step, we introduce a suitable conceptualization of role
models for preference intensities. We derive these from the choices of socio–
economic actions of adults. Specifically, we assume that any feasible socio–
economic action is characteristic for the display of exactly one intensity of
the preferences. Thus, the role models for the children’s social learning of
preference intensities are the displayed preference intensities of the observed
socio–economic actions of adults.
In a second step we then show how the preference intensity that a child
adopts through the socialization process results as a weighted average be-
tween the displayed preference intensity that is chosen by its family4 and the
average displayed preference intensity that the child observes in its general
adult social environment; and further, how the adopted preference intensi-
ties can then be interpreted to induce preferences over displayed preference
intensities, respectively the underlying socio–economic actions.
In a third step we introduce one possible framework to endogenize this
cultural formation of preferences process, which will be based on purposeful
socialization decisions of parents5. That parents are willing to engage into
associated costs of active socialization stems from the fact that they obtain
an inter–generational utility component. Specifically, we let this utility be
negatively related to the distance between the adopted preference intensity
of their adult children and a parentally perceived optimal preference inten-
sity.
The parental decision problem is it then to choose their weight in the
child’s socialization process (as in previous contributions) and their dis-
played preference intensity, given their perceived optimal preference inten-
sity and given the average displayed preference intensity of the general social
environment. Since the latter results of the individual parents’ choices, this
introduces strategic interaction. We characterize the corresponding parental
best reply choices, and introduce conditions under which a Nash equilib-
rium in pure strategies exists. These equilibrium choices determine the
inter–generational evolution of the preference intensities (and with it the
preferences) of the society.
Outline The further outline of this paper is as follows. Section 2 in-
troduces the general representation of the cultural formation of preferences
process, while as section 3 delivers a framework for its endogeneization. The
4The family’s choice of a displayed preference intensity can be interpreted as the gen-
eralized and continuous equivalent to the ‘preference shaping demonstration effect’ of Cox
and Stark [17]; see also Stark [48].
5Alternative, and not elsewhere cited, approaches that deal with preference endogeneity
in ‘non–purposeful–socialization’ frameworks are based on e.g. ‘bandwagon’ or ‘snob’
effects (Leibenstein [33]), ‘keeping up with the Joneses’ (Duesenberry [19]), ‘emulation
effects’ (Veblen [49]) or ‘interdependent preferences’ (Pollak [38]).
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proofs of the propositions in the latter section can be found in Appendix
A. Section 4 discusses additional aspects that show routes how to apply
the model, and section 5 concludes. Finally, Appendix B characterizes the
dynamic evolution of the preference intensities if all parents have ‘imper-
fect empathy’ (this concept is due to Bisin and Verdier [7] and is shortly
discussed in section 3.1).
2 Cultural Formation of Preferences
. . . or: We are all the sum total of our experiences.
In this section, we will show how children adopt intensities of any type of
continuous preferences (e.g. ‘patience (intensity)’) through social learning
from role models for preference intensities, and how the adopted preference
intensities induce preference relations over choices of the role models in
the adult life period. This kind of closed circle is the motivation to label
the representation of the socialization process that this paper proposes as
cultural formation of preferences.
Consider an overlapping generations society populated by a continuum
of adults6, a ∈ A = [0, 1] endowed with Lebesgue measure λ, and their
children. For ease of exposition, we will assume that reproduction is asexual
and every adult has one offspring, so that we can denote with a˜ ∈ A˜ the
children of the parents a ∈ A.
Let us assume that all adults have available the same feasible set of
socio–economic actions, X ⊆ Rn. The structure of the latter is such that
any typical element x ∈ X is the characteristic role model for exactly one
preference intensity (PI). We will call this the displayed preference intensity
(DPI) of a choice of socio–economic actions x, φd(x) ∈ R.7 Thus, there
exists a displayed preference intensity function
φd : X 7→ R
where φd(X) then corresponds to the set of possible DPIs8. Subsequently, it
will be convenient to denote the DPI of the socio–economic actions of adult
a ∈ A, xa ∈ X, as φ
d
a := φ
d(xa).
Example 1 (Patience Preferences). Consider the case of ‘patience prefer-
ences’, and assume that there is only one socio–economic action category
6The logic of the cultural formation of preferences process that is presented in the
present paper would be preserved in the case where the set of adults is finite.
7This can be interpreted in the way that any adult who observes another adult a ∈ A
taking socio–economic actions x ∈ X could reflect upon this observation by the statement
that ‘adult a behaves as if she would have a PI of φd(x)’.
8The function φd assigns to any element of X a relative position in φd(X). Thus, any
affine transformation of φd, b+ dφd, where b ∈ R and d ∈ R++, would represent the same
DPIs, since it assigns the same relative positions in b+ dφd(X).
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that serves as a role model for the social learning of patience (intensity).
Let this be the share of adult period income that is saved for pension pe-
riod consumption. Denoting as ya ∈ R++ the adult period income, and as
sa ∈ [0, ya] the savings of adult a ∈ A (there is no lending), we thus have
that xa ≡
sa
ya
∈ [0, 1] ≡ X. Naturally, we want φd to be strictly increas-
ing in the present case, so that we can simply choose φd(x) = x and then
φd(X) = [0, 1].
We will now introduce the representation of the socialization process
that this paper proposes. This will be established on grounds of the tabula
rasa assumption, which means in the present context that children are born
with undefined PI, and equally, with undefined preferences (a correspond-
ing assumption is also taken in the literature on the economics of cultural
transmission, see e.g. Bisin and Verdier [9]). This assumption implies that
we restrict the analysis of the determination, respectively formation, of pref-
erences to cultural factors (‘nurture’), while as the issue of the contribution
of genetic inheritance (‘nature’) is left aside9.
On this basis, we then let the formation of the PI that a child adopts re-
sult out of social learning from the DPIs of adults (only) that it is confronted
with. Specifically, this is being embedded in a framework of socialization
inside the family and by the general adult social environment, or ‘direct ver-
tical and oblique socialization’. This terminology stems from Cavalli-Sforza
and Feldman [16], and is distinguished from ‘horizontal socialization’, viz.
the socialization influence of members of the same generation (which we
leave unconsidered in the present paper). In this context, we will let the
PI that a child a˜ ∈ A˜ adopts be formed according to a weighted average
between the DPI of its family, i.e. its single parent a ∈ A, φda ∈ φ
d(X), and
the average DPI of the (child’s) general social environment10, A\{a},∫
A\{a}
φda′ dλ
(
a′
)
=
∫
A
φda′ dλ
(
a′
)
=: φdA ∈ con φ
d(X).11
The weight that the DPI of the parent of a child a˜ ∈ A˜ has in the social-
ization process of the child will be called the parental socialization success
9An introduction to the cross–disciplinary ‘nature–nurture’ debate can be found in
Rogers [41]; Sacerdote [42, 43, 44] provides for empirical investigations of the relative
importances of both influences.
10Indeed, to require that the child’s social learning from the general social environment
is in terms of the average DPI of its members constitutes a strong and restrictive assump-
tion. It means that all DPIs of the unrelated adults are assumed to have an identical
social learning impact on the child. Both Sa´ez-Mart´ı and Sjo¨gren [45] (in the cultural
transmission of preferences context) and Panebianco [36] (in the cultural formation of
preferences context) introduce possible alternatives to this assumption.
11To see that the average choice of a continuum of players endowed with Lebesgue
measure and with identical choice set (a subset of Rn) is indeed located in the convex hull
of the choice set, confer e.g. Rath [40, p. 430].
5
Michael Pichler
share, σˆa ∈ [0, 1]. This corresponds to the cognitive impact of the parental
DPI relative to the cognitive impact of the general social environment’s aver-
age DPI. Factors that would determine this relative cognitive impact would
include the social(ization) interaction time of the parent with its child, as
well as the effort and devotion that the parent spends to socialize its child
to the chosen DPI12.
We now obtain the formation of the PI that a child a˜ ∈ A˜ adopts through
the ‘direct vertical and oblique socialization’ process, φa˜, as
φa˜ = σˆaφ
d
a + (1− σˆa)φ
d
A. (1)
We will call this the parental socialization technique13. It embodies the view
that the parents set a PI benchmark, φda, and can invest into their parental
socialization success share, σˆa, to countervail the socialization influence that
the child is exposed to in its general social environment, φdA. Since the final
adopted PI of a child is by construction a convex combination of all DPIs that
it observes, the set of possible PIs (that a child can adopt), then coincides
with the convex hull of the set of possible DPIs, con φd(X) ⊆ R (a convex
subset of the real line).
Example 2 (Discrete Choice Sets). To illustrate the last point consider
any discrete choice set of socio–economic actions, and let us take the sim-
plest (non–degenerate) example where X = {0, 1}, e.g. not buying or buying
a status good. Let again φd(x) = x, so that φd(X) = {0, 1}. However,
under the formation of PIs (1), we have that the set of possible PIs is
con φd(X) = [0, 1]. Thus, although adults can only display through their
socio–economic actions that they either disfavor/not have (x = 0) or fa-
vor/have (x = 1) a certain preference (e.g. ‘status’), the children can adopt
also any intermediate PI through the socialization process.
We will assume that the PI that a child adopts through the socialization
process is being internalized and kept in its adult life–period. Notably, the
concept of an adopted PI of an adult corresponds to a cognitive element in
the cognitive dissonance theory of Festinger [22] — and so does the con-
cept of a DPI. According to the cognitive dissonance theory, people dislike
dissonance between cognitive elements, the strength of which depends on
the degree of the dissonance. In the present context, it is immediate that
this degree of dissonance is being determined by the (Euclidean) distance
between a DPI and the adopted PI. Thus, adults can compare and rank
different DPIs based on their distance to the adopted PI. Obviously then,
since socio–economic actions are pre–images of DPIs, the adopted PI of an
12See e.g. Grusec [27] for an introductory overview of theories on determinants of
parental socialization success.
13Equation (1) is a generalization of the representation of the formation of continuous
preferences (traits) in Bisin and Topa [5] and (with certain respects) Panebianco [36].
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adult does also constitute a ‘filter’ under which adults can compare and rank
different choices of socio–economic actions.
Assumption 1 (Preferences). ∀a ∈ A,
(a) the adopted PI, φa ∈ con φ
d(X), induces a complete and transitive pref-
erence relation ≻φa over DPIs φda ∈ con φ
d(X),14 and
(b) the preferences ≻φa are single–peaked with peak φa. This means that
∀φda, φ
′d
a ∈ con φ
d(X), φda ≻
φa φ′da ⇐ φ
′d
a <> φ
d
a ≤≥ φa.
Given their basic properties, we will represent the preferences ≻φa by single–
peaked utility functions with peak φa
uφa : con φd(X) 7→ R
which are strictly increasing/decreasing at all φda ∈ con φ
d(X) such that
φda < / > φa.
Example 3 (‘Displayed Patience’ Utility). Continuing the first example,
assume that adults earn interest on their savings and, thus, their pension
period consumption is (1+ r)sa, r ∈ R+ (prices are constant and there is no
other pension period income and also no bequests).
Assuming Cobb–Douglas utility, the life–time utility out of the adult sav-
ings decision can be represented as uφa (sa) = (ya−sa)
1−φa ((1 + r)sa)
φa, i.e.
consumptions in the first and second life period are weighted according to the
‘impatience’ and ‘patience’ (intensities). Dividing and multiplying the right
hand side of the latter by ya, we obtain u
φa
(
φda
)
=
(
1− φda
)1−φa (φda)φa ·(
ya(1 + r)
φa
)
. Thus, we have transformed utility out of a socio–economic
choice into utility out of the choice of ‘displayed patience (intensity)’, φda. It
is immediate that
∂ uφa(φda)
∂ φda
>=< 0 ∀φda ∈ [0, 1] such that φ
d
a <=> φa so that
the single peak property is satisfied naturally (furthermore, uφa is strictly
concave).
3 Endogenous Cultural Formation of Preferences
. . . or: How far does the apple fall from the tree?
In the previous section, we have introduced a representation of the inter–
generational formation of continuous preferences. One major innovation
that this approach embodies is that it interconnects the socio–economic (re-
spectively DPI) choices of the adult generation with the preferences over
14Equally, thus, φa ∈ con φ
d(X), induces a complete and transitive preference relation
≻φa over socio–economic actions xa ∈ X, where ∀xa, x
′
a ∈ X, xa ≻
φa x′a ⇔ φ
d (xa) ≻
φa
φd (x′a).
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the available choices that the next generation adults adopt. Thus, any
model framework that determines the adult socio–economic (respectively
DPI) choices, together with the parental socialization success shares, equally
endogenizes the cultural formation of preferences process (see section 4 for a
more detailed discussion). In the present section, we will lay down one spe-
cific way of achieving this endogeneization based on purposeful socialization
decisions of parents.
3.1 Motivation for Purposeful Socialization
In a first step, we have to clarify what motivation parents have to actively
engage in their children’s socialization process, i.e. what induces them to
purposefully employ their socialization technique (the functioning of which
we assume here the parents to be fully aware of). Basically, we let this mo-
tivation stem from the fact that parents also obtain an inter–generational
utility component that is either related to the adopted PI of their adult chil-
dren and/or to the DPI (respectively the underlying socio–economic actions)
that they expect their adult children to take.
As far as the latter expectations are concerned, we make here an as-
sumption on a specific form of parental myopia: Although parents obtain
an inter–generational utility component, which eventually induces them to
choose a DPI that does not coincide with their adopted PI (see below), we
assume that they do not realize that this form of behavior changing im-
pact will also be present in their adult children’s decision problems. Thus,
any parent a ∈ A expects its adult child to choose a DPI that is in the
set of maximizers of its ‘own’ utility function, argmaxφda˜∈φd(X)
uφa˜
(
φda˜
)
.
Under the following assumption, φd(X) is convex (and compact, which
will be needed in the propositions below), and thus φd(X) = con φd(X).
This then guarantees by the single–peakedness of the utility functions that
argmaxφda˜∈φd(X)
uφa˜
(
φda˜
)
= φa˜, ∀a ∈ A, so that the parental expectations of
their adult children’s DPIs are uniquely determined15.
Assumption 2 (Convexity and Compactness). X ⊆ Rn is non–empty,
convex and compact, and φd is continuous. If n > 1, then φd is additionally
concave.
Given this form of myopic expectations, it is independent of whether the
inter–generational utility component of a parent is related to the adopted
PI or expected DPI of its adult child, since the latter coincides with the
first. Under this property, we will now assume that any parent perceives an
optimal preference intensity, such that if the adult child adopts this optimal
15That parents are not aware of the inter–generational utility of their children does also
have the simplifying consequence that they do not care about their whole dynasty (this
point has already been made by Bisin and Verdier [9, p. 305] in the context of cultural
transmission of preferences).
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PI, then this is considered by the parent to be ‘inter–generational utility
maximal’. These parent–specific optimal PIs are subject to what we call
construction rules. Thereby, for any parent a construction rule is determined
by two ‘ingredients’. The first one specifies a (set of) subset(s) of adults,
respectively reference group(s); and the second one specifies the construction
of the optimal PI that a parent perceives out of characteristics of the adults
in these reference group(s) that are either observable (notably the DPIs of
adults) or known to an individual parent.
Definition 1 (Construction Rule). Let A be a σ–algebra of subsets of A.
Then, the construction rule for the optimal PI perceived by parent a ∈ A is a
pair
(
Ra, φˆa˜
)
, where ∅ 6= Ra ⊆ {a}∪A and where φˆa˜ : {a}∪A 7→ con φ
d(X),
φˆa˜ (Ra) ∈ con φ
d(X).
To ease the interpretation of this conceptualization, we will briefly in-
troduce three sensible types of construction rules for optimal PIs (this list is
not meant to be exhaustive — and notably, one could consider combinations
of the three types mentioned).
CR 1 The optimal PI of a parent a ∈ A is identical to its adopted PI,
Ra = {a} and φˆa˜ ({a}) = φa ∈ con φ
d(X).
One justification to consider this construction rule is based on a spe-
cial form of parental altruism called ‘imperfect empathy’. This con-
cept has been introduced into the economics literature by Bisin and
Verdier [7]. Parents are altruistic and fully internalize the utility of
their adult child’s socio–economic actions (respectively DPI). Nev-
ertheless, parents can not perfectly empathize with their child and
can only evaluate their adult child’s utility under their own (not the
child’s) utility function — which attains its maximum at the adopted
PI of the parent.
CR 2 The optimal PI of a parent a ∈ A is identical to a parent–specific
(model–exogenous) PI, Ra = {a} and φˆa˜ ({a}) = ea ∈ con φ
d(X).
One motivation for this construction rule could be that the preference
under scrutiny is a ‘good preference’ where parents thus want to max-
imize the PI of their adult children. This also would concern certain
characteristics (preferences) that are e.g. favorable on the labor mar-
ket (and thus increase the future expected income of the adult child,
which the parents would aim to maximize if they are altruistic — and
if their own utility function is increasing in monetary payoff).
CR 3 The optimal PI of a parent a ∈ A is identical to the average DPI of
a subset (with strictly positive measure) of the adults, Ra ⊆ A, and
φˆa˜ (Ra) =
1
λ(Ra)
∫
Ra
φda′ dλ (a
′) ∈ con φd(X).
9
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One potential justification for this construction rule is the case of
endogenous behavioral norms that equate to the average DPI of the
respective subset of the adults. Norms are typically maintained by
members of a group (a subset of the adults) through a system of social
rewards and punishments (see e.g. Arnett [1]). In the present context,
these could be related to the parents’ success or failure to guarantee
that the child will behave according to the behavioral norm.
Given the construction rules and the resulting optimal PIs, we assume
further that parents perceive utility losses for deviations of the adopted PI
of their children from these optimal PIs (note the structural analogy to the
before introduced preferences and utility that are induced by adopted PIs).
Specifically, for any parent a ∈ A, we introduce the parameter ia ∈ R+ that
shall capture the strength of the perceived inter–generational utility losses.
We will call this the parent’s inter–generational preference intensity16. No-
tably, this latter type of PI can also be interpreted as being subject to a
cultural formation of preferences process. Nevertheless, we choose here for
simplicity a degenerate representation of this process and assume that the
inter–generational PIs are invariably passed over from an adult to its child,
ia˜ = ia, ∀a ∈ A.
Assumption 3 (Inter–generational Utility). ∀a ∈ A,
(a) there is an inter–generational utility function vφˆa˜(Ra) (· |ia ) : con φ
d(X) 7→
R, vφˆa˜(Ra) (φa˜ |ia ) ∈ R, where
(b) ∀ia ∈ R++, v
φˆa˜(Ra) (· |ia ) is single–peaked with peak φˆa˜ (Ra), thus strictly
increasing/decreasing at all φa˜ ∈ con φ
d(X) such that φa˜ < / > φˆa˜.
17
3.2 Optimization Problems and Best Replies
In the last step toward the construction of the parental optimization prob-
lems, let us finally discuss the cost associated with investments into con-
trolling the parental socialization success share. These would concern e.g.
the opportunity cost of the time parents spend for the active socialization
of a child, as well as the (psychological) cost of the effort and devotion in-
vested. We will represent these cost by an indirect cost function of choices
of socialization success shares. Notably, we also allow for the dependence of
16In the case of the motivations given for the first and second type of construction
rule, the inter–generational PI could be interpreted as the ‘intensity of parental altruism’.
In the case of behavioral norms (the motivation for the third type of CR), it could be
interpreted as the (perceived) strength of the norm, i.e. how important conformism to the
behavioral norm is for the members of the group. As a consequence, it then also reflects
the intensity of the social rewards and punishments within that group.
17Under imperfect empathy of adult a ∈ A, one could straightforwardly specify
vφˆa˜(Ra) (φa˜ |ia ) = iau
φa (φa˜).
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the cost of any such choice on the ‘credibility’ that children would assign to
their parents’ implicit claims that their proposed PIs (their choices of DPIs)
are the optimal ones for the children to adopt. In the present context, it
seems reasonable to let this ‘credibility’ depend on the level of satisfaction,
i.e. utility, that the parents could generate out of their choices of DPIs18.
For any a ∈ A, we thus propose a parental socialization success share cost
function c : [0, 1]× R 7→ R+, c
(
σˆa, u
φa
(
φda
))
∈ R+.
19
The parental optimization problem is it then to choose a DPI and its
socialization success share such as to maximize the life–time utility net of
the cost of achieving the chosen socialization success share. Assuming addi-
tive separability of the (inter–generational) utility and cost functions (which
significantly simplifies the subsequent analysis), we obtain, ∀a ∈ A,
max
(φda,σˆa)∈φd(X)×[0,1]
uφa
(
φda
)
+ vφˆa˜(Ra) (φa˜ |ia )− c
(
σˆa, u
φa
(
φda
))
(2)
s.t. φa˜ = σˆaφ
d
a + (1− σˆa)φ
d
A.
Thus, the optimization problems of the parents basically consist of trad-
ing off ‘own’ utility losses that they experience when choosing a DPI that
deviates from their adopted PI together with the cost of a choice of their
socialization success share against resulting inter–generational utility gains
that they experience through improvements of the location of their children’s
adopted PI.
The first important issue to note with respect to these optimization
problems is that they induce individual sets of pairs of best reply choices
against the average DPI of the general social environment, and subject to
the optimal PI, the adopted PI and the inter–generational PI. For any
a ∈ A, we will therefore denote any of the pairs of best reply choices as(
φda
(
φdA, φˆa˜ (Ra) , φa, ia
)
, σˆa
(
φdA, φˆa˜ (Ra) , φa, ia
))
, which will subsequently
be abbreviated as
(
φda (·) , σˆa (·)
)
. Furthermore, together with the average
DPI of the general social environment, any of the parental best replies also
determines a best reply location of the adult child’s adopted PI (through
the formation of PIs (1)), φa˜
(
φda (·) , σˆa (·) , φ
d
A
)
.
18We find (indirect) support of this hypothesis in Sears et al. [47] (the child’s desire to
imitate positive features of the parent), and in Grusec and Goodnow [28] (in the context
of factors that determine the child’s acceptance of parental messages).
19That parents can choose their socialization success shares within the whole unit in-
terval is a non–trivial assumption (which is though also taken in Bisin and Topa [5] and
Panebianco [36]). It means that both an exclusive parental socialization of a child, i.e.
σˆa = 1, as well as an exclusive socialization of a child by the general social environment,
i.e. σˆa = 0, are possible (as well as all intermediate cases).
Notably, the assumption that every adult a ∈ A has available all choices
(
φda, σˆa
)
∈
con φd(X) × [0, 1] implies that through their socialization technique, parents can, irre-
spective of φdA ∈ con φ
d(X), achieve any φa˜ ∈ con φ
d(X) (which differs from previous
contributions).
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The following assumption specifies additional properties of the (inter–
generational) utility and cost functions. These will allow for a significant
characterization of the individual pairs of best reply choices, as well as of
the resulting best reply locations of the adopted PIs of the adult children.
Assumption 4 (Slope). ∀a ∈ A,
(a) uφa and vφˆa˜(Ra) (· |ia ) are continuous, and differentiable at their peaks,
(b) c is continuous, and differentiable with respect to the first argument
at the point σˆa = 0, where
∂c(0,·)
∂σˆa
= 0, strictly increasing in the first
argument ∀σˆa ∈ (0, 1], and decreasing in the second argument.
Note that since both the utility and inter–generational utility function
are single peaked, it follows under Assumption 4 (a) that ∀a ∈ A, ∂ u
φa (φa)
∂ φda
=
0, as well as
∂ vφˆa˜(Ra)(φˆa˜(Ra),ia)
∂ φa˜
= 0. Thus, parents perceive zero (inter–
generational) utility losses for marginal deviations of their chosen DPI from
their adopted PI, respectively of their adult child’s adopted PI from the
optimal PI.
In the following two propositions, we assume that the construction rules
for the optimal PIs of all parents are as such that the individual parents’
decisions have (at most) a negligible impact on the location of their own
optimal PI.
Proposition 1 (Characterization of Best Replies). Let Assumptions 1–4
hold. Then, if
(a) φdA 6= φˆa˜ (Ra), generically
20 sign
(
φda (·)− φa
)
= − sign
(
φdA − φˆa˜ (Ra)
)
and σˆa (·) > 0, while always sign
(
φa˜
(
φda (·) , σˆa (·) , φ
d
A
)
− φˆa˜ (Ra)
)
=
sign
(
φdA − φˆa˜ (Ra)
)
.
(b) φdA = φˆa˜ (Ra), it holds that φ
d
a (·) − φa = 0 and σˆa (·) = 0, hence
φa˜
(
φa, 0, φˆa˜ (Ra)
)
− φˆa˜ (Ra) = 0.
Proof. In Appendix A.
20There are two kinds of exceptions to the generic characterization. The first is that if
the deviation of the best reply DPI from the adopted PI into the characterized direction
is not possible, i.e. if the adopted PI of a parent coincides with (the relevant) one of the
boundaries of φd(X), then the best reply DPI will coincide with that boundary (while
as still generically σˆa (·) > 0). The second is that in the cases where φˆa˜ (Ra) > φa and
φdA ∈
(
φa, φˆa˜ (Ra)
)
, respectively where φˆa˜ (Ra) < φa and φ
d
A ∈
(
φˆa˜ (Ra) , φa
)
, it can also
hold that sign
(
φda (·)− φa
)
= 0 and σˆa (·) = 0, hence φa˜
(
φa, 0, φ
d
A
)
= φdA.
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The (generic) results of this proposition are illustrated in Figure 1. The left
pair of graphs stylizes case (a) of Proposition 1, and the right pair the case
(b). In both pairs of graphs, in the left interval (all intervals correspond
to the set of possible DPIs) the context of the adult’s decision problem is
depicted, while as in the right interval a corresponding best reply choice is
stylized. As can be seen both from Proposition 1 directly, as well as from
the graphical illustration, the results feature two dominant characteristics.
φa˜
(
φda (·) , σˆa (·) , φ
d
A
)
φdA
φda(·)
φa˜
(
φa, 0, φˆa˜ (Ra)
)
φa φda(·)
φˆa˜ (Ra)
•
•
•
φdA = φˆa˜ (Ra)
•
•
•
•
φa
σˆa(·) > 0
•
•
•
•
•
Figure 1: Characterization of Best Replies
The first concerns the generic location of the best reply choices. If the
average DPI does not coincide with the optimal PI, then parents countervail
the respective socialization influence on their children by choosing strictly
positive socialization instruments. This means first that they choose a DPI
that deviates from their adopted PI — and this deviation is into the opposite
direction as the deviation of the average DPI from the optimal PI (if such
a choice is available); and second, this behavioral countervailing is coupled
with a strictly positive choice of their parental socialization success share
(since otherwise, their chosen DPI would be fully ineffective in the child’s
socialization process).
That parents would generically choose strictly positive socialization in-
struments even for very small deviations of the average DPI from the optimal
PI is due to the fact that marginal investments into the socialization instru-
ments are (utility) costless (while as the resulting strictly positive decrease
in the distance of the adult child’s adopted PI from the optimal PI yields
a strictly positive inter–generational utility gain). Obviously, if the average
DPI exactly coincides with the optimal PI, then parents have no incentives
to actively employ their socialization technique and choose zero investments
into their socialization instruments.
The second dominant characteristic concerns the location of the adult
children’s adopted PIs that would result out of the parental best reply
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choices. Despite the parental countervailing in the case of suboptimal so-
cialization influences of the general social environment, the investments into
their socialization instruments would never be intense enough such as to
guarantee that their adult children’s adopted PIs would exactly coincide
with the optimal PIs. Hence, there is always a strictly positive deviation of
the adopted PI of an adult child from the parentally perceived optimal PI,
the direction of which accords with the direction of deviation of the average
DPI from the optimal DPI.
That the latter result holds for even very small deviations of the average
DPI from the optimal DPI stems from the fact that parents do not perceive
inter–generational utility losses for an only marginal deviation of the adult
child’s adopted PI from the optimal PI (while at any already strictly posi-
tive choice of the socialization instruments, the marginal cost of additional
investments to further reduce the distance between the adult child’s adopted
PI and the optimal PI would be strictly positive). Again obviously, in the
case where the average DPI is optimal, the adopted PI of an adult child will
also coincide with the optimal PI.
The following list of assumptions will be prerequisite for a further charac-
terization of the parental best reply choices in terms of comparative statics.
Assumption 5 (Curvature). ∀a ∈ A,
(a) uφa and vφˆa˜(Ra) (· |ia ) are C
2 and strictly concave, c is C2 and convex,
and
(b) sign
(
φˆa˜ (Ra)− φa˜
)
∂2 vφˆa˜(Ra)(φa˜|ia )
∂ φa˜ ∂ ia
> 0, i.e. the marginal cost of a devi-
ation of the adopted PI of the adult child from the optimal PI is strictly
increasing in the inter–generational PI.
Note that Assumption 5 (b) is only necessary for the results related to the
second column of the comparative statics matrix below to hold.
Proposition 2 (Comparative Statics of Best Replies). Let Assumptions 1–
5 be satisfied. Then, if φdA 6= φˆa˜ (Ra) and the optimization problem of parent
a ∈ A is strictly concave at its best reply choice, and if the two socialization
instruments
∣∣φda (·)− φa∣∣ and σˆa (·) are ‘not too strong substitutes’, then21

∂|φda(φdA,φˆa˜(Ra),φa,ia)−φa|
∂|φdA−φˆa˜(Ra)|
∂|φda(φdA,φˆa˜(Ra),φa,ia)−φa|
∂ ia
∂ σˆa(φdA,φˆa˜(Ra),φa,ia)
∂|φdA−φˆa˜(Ra)|
∂ σˆa(φdA,φˆa˜(Ra),φa,ia)
∂ ia

≫ 0.
21A technical version of the latter condition can be found in the proof of this proposition.
Note that these comparative statics are subject to a fixed location of the parental PI.
Furthermore, we assume here that none of the constraints of the decision variables is
binding at the best reply choices. This assumption rules out both kinds of ‘non–generic’
cases in Proposition 1 (in the second kind, the lower bound for the parental socialization
success shares would be binding).
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Proof. In Appendix A.
The first column of the comparative statics matrix shows that (under
the relevant conditions), parents use their investments into their socializa-
tion instruments and the average DPI of the general social environment as
cultural substitutes. This means that if the average DPI becomes more fa-
vorable (i.e. its distance to the optimal PI becomes smaller), then parents
would reduce investments into both socialization instruments.
The second column sheds light on the role that the inter–generational
PI plays in determining the parental socialization decisions. Under the con-
ditions of Proposition 2, parents with a higher inter–generational PI would
choose more intense investments into their socialization instruments for any
given strictly positive distance between the average DPI and the optimal
PI. This follows since the socialization PI basically determines the weight
that parents put on their inter–generational utility. Thus, given a higher
inter–generational PI, parents are willing to engage more ‘own’ utility losses
and socialization success share cost such as to reduce their comparatively
larger inter–generational utility losses.
3.3 Equilibrium and Evolution
After having characterized the individual best reply choices of a DPI and a
parental socialization success share, the next step is to discuss the existence
of a (pure strategy) Nash equilibrium of the game that is induced by the
strategic interdependence of the individual parental choices. To do this, it
will be important to carefully clarify the nature of the possible forms of the
strategic interdependences, given the general model structure of the present
section.
First of all, as has already been discussed, the net life–time utility of an
individual parent, i.e. the object of its optimization problem (2), depends on
the location of the average DPI of the general social environment (while as
it is independent of the other parents’ choices of their socialization success
shares). Second, the decisions of the other adults could influence the net life–
time utility of an individual parent via the construction rule for its optimal
PI (as e.g. in the third type of construction rule introduced in section 3.1).
In this respect, for the existence proposition below to hold, we will require
the additional normalization that if the construction rule of a parent is based
on the DPIs and/or socialization success shares of a subset of the adults,
then this is only only in terms of the respective average(s).
The general structure of the strategic interdependence of the individual
parental decisions is then such that there is a finite partition of the adult
set, {Aj}
k
j=1 (and A is the σ–algebra induced by this partition), where
the net expected life–time utility of all individual parents depends on the
tuple of pairs of average DPIs and average parental socialization success
15
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shares,
{
φdAj , σˆAj
}k
j=1
, where ∀j = 1, . . . , k, φdAj :=
1
λ(Aj)
∫
Aj
φda′ dλ (a
′) and
σˆAj :=
1
λ(Aj)
∫
Aj
σˆa′ dλ (a
′).22
The payoff, i.e. the net life–time utility, that any parent gains out of
its own decision pair and any given profile of pairs of average decisions
of the subsets of adults is determined by the parent’s adopted PI and
inter–generational PI, as well as on the construction rule for its optimal
PI. These triples thus fully characterize the adults, and we will denote the
payoff function of an individual adult a ∈ A as P
(
·, ·
∣∣∣φa, ia,(Ra, φˆa˜)) :(
φd(X)× [0, 1]
)k+1
7→ R, P
((
φda, σˆa
)
,
{
φdAj , σˆAj
}k
j=1
∣∣∣φa, ia,(Ra, φˆa˜)
)
∈
R.23 We hence obtain a family of games, parametrized by the tuple of adult
profile triples,
Γ
({
φa, ia,
(
Ra, φˆa˜
)}
a∈A
)
=(
A,
(
φd(X)× [0, 1]
)A
,
{
P
(
·, ·
∣∣∣φa, ia,(Ra, φˆa˜))}
a∈A
)
.
Definition 2 (Nash Equilibrium24). Call a tuple
{
φd
∗
a , σˆ
∗
a
}
a∈A
a Nash equi-
librium of the game Γ
({
φa, ia,
(
Ra, φˆa˜
)}
a∈A
)
, if for almost all a ∈ A,
∀
(
φda, σˆa
)
∈ φd(X)×[0, 1], P
((
φd
∗
a , σˆ
∗
a
)
,
{
φd
∗
Aj
, σˆ∗Aj
}k
j=1
∣∣∣φa, ia,(Ra, φˆa˜)
)
≥
P
((
φda, σˆa
)
,
{
φd
∗
Aj
, σˆ∗Aj
}k
j=1
∣∣∣φa, ia,(Ra, φˆa˜)
)
.
Proposition 3 (Nash Equilibrium Existence). If Assumptions 1—3 hold,
and if the functions φˆa˜ are continuous for every a ∈ A, then a Nash equilib-
rium exists for any parametrized game.
Proof. This proof is a straightforward generalization of the proof of Theorem
2 in Rath [40], and can be obtained from the author as a separate note.
22Note that we do explicitly neither require here that the construction rules for the
optimal PIs of all parents are based on all (or even any) of the subsets of the partition of
the adult set, nor that they depend both on the average DPI and the average parental
socialization success share of a subset. In the first case, the optimal PIs would then simply
be constant for all values that the average DPIs and average parental socialization success
shares take on all ‘irrelevant’ subsets; and in the second case, this would be true for all
values of either the average DPI or the average parental socialization success share of a
subset concerned.
23The representation of the individual payoff functions does also incorporate the depen-
dence of the parental payoffs on the average DPI of the general social environment, since
φdA =
∑k
j=1 λ (Aj)φ
d
Aj
. Also note for completeness that since the parental payoffs are
independent of the other parents’ choices of socialization success shares, they are simply
constant ∀σˆA =
∑k
j=1 λ (Aj) σˆAj ∈ [0, 1].
24This definition follows Schmeidler [46] and Rath [40].
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The existence result above means that in any given period, we can use (a
selection of) the Nash equilibrium choices for substitution in the formation
of PIs equation (1). By doing so, we obtain an endogenous representation
of the inter–generational formation of PIs, i.e. we have endogenized the
cultural formation of preferences process.
In a dynamic context, the model framework does hence endogenously de-
termine the evolution of the DPIs and the underlying socio–economic choices
(and the parental socialization success shares), as well as the evolution of
the PIs and the induced preferences of a society. Notably, these dynamics
will be subject to a specification of the (initial) tuple of adult profile triples.
This means to specify (a) the initial tuple of PIs (which are the state vari-
ables of the model and evolve endogenously), (b) the inter–temporarily fixed
tuple of inter–generational PIs, and (c) the tuple of construction rules for
optimal PIs. Lacking a theory of the formation of the latter, it is sensible to
assume for simplicity that they are (like the inter–generational PIs) invari-
antly passed over from a parent to its child, hence inter–temporarily fixed.
Furthermore, to impose a minimum level of structure on the analysis, it
would in any case be sensible to consider only assignments of equal types of
construction rules to all parents (e.g. one of the three types of construction
rules introduced in section 3.1).
Notably, among the three types of (initial) adult profile tuples, it is the
specification of the tuple of construction rules that can be supposed to most
centrally govern the qualitative properties of the dynamics of any specified
model (within the framework of the present section). Roughly spoken, the
reasoning for this is that in any given period, the optimal PIs determine the
direction of the purposeful socialization efforts of the parents, independent
of the contextual effects that are induced by their adopted PIs (and the fixed
inter–generational PIs govern the relative strength of the two effects).
This ‘power’ of the tuple of construction rules can be illustrated by means
of a particularly simple example. Consider the case where all parents have
the first (imperfect empathy) type of construction rules. Then, it is easy to
show (and we did in Appendix B) that the following results hold for every
possible tuple of pairs of initial PIs and inter–generational PIs: (a) Between
any two succeeding periods, the PIs of the adults assimilate (almost surely),
which means that the minimum PI that any of the adults has adopted is
strictly increasing while the maximum PI that any of the adults has adopted
is strictly decreasing (but the PI dispersion stays strictly positive) and thus
(b) the tuple of PIs of the adults converges to a point where the PIs of all
adults are identical, and (c) any such point is a steady state.
Of course, not all possible specifications of the tuple of construction rules
will yield as simple characteristics of the resulting dynamics. In any case,
it shall have become clear from the above discussion that any significant
qualitative characterization of dynamic properties will have to be based on
a sensible specification of the model framework of the present section.
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4 Applications
In the preceding two sections, we have laid down a general framework to
determine the inter–generational formation of continuous preferences. Given
its generality, this framework can be specified for applications in a large
variety of different settings and socio–economic questions. In what follows,
we will briefly outline four different dimensions along the lines of which any
application, respectively specification, of the model could be oriented.
Level of the Analysis Any analysis of the properties of a specified model
can be pursued on two different levels. The first, ‘meta–level analysis’, takes
place at the level of the intensities of the preference under scrutiny, and
concerns the evolution of the PIs and DPIs, as discussed already above.
Interesting issues in this context would then typically be to characterize the
dynamics of the model under different specifications of the tuple of (initial)
adult triples. Specifically, it would be of interest to identify specifications
of tuples of construction rules under which (stable) heterogeneous and/or
homogeneous steady state distributions of the PIs exist (for the first type
of construction rule as presented in section 3.1, we could show that only
homogeneous steady state distributions can exist; see Appendix B).
The second, ‘empirical analysis’, would take place at the level of the
observable socio–economic choices of the adults. For this end, it would be
necessary to clarify (a) which socio–economic choices are supposed to serve
as the role models for the social learning of the intensities of the preference
under scrutiny, and (b) how the relationship between the socio–economic
choices and the DPIs can be represented in terms of the DPI function.
Given this, the ‘meta–level analysis’ would additionally answer the question
of the evolution of the underlying socio–economic choices.
Complexity of the Adult Problem The purposeful socialization frame-
work of section 3 embeds parents that are endowed with inter–generational
concern in a strategic socialization interaction environment, in which they
choose optimal DPIs and socialization success shares. This structure en-
tails a certain degree of complexity, which could, however, be decreased
by employing alternative (less ‘rich’) designs of the parental optimization
problems. These would either feature a lower dimensionality and/or would
eliminate the strategic socialization interaction — and it depends indeed
on the specific application, which of these alternatives would eventually be
suitable.
One alternative that reduces the dimensionality of the parental optimiza-
tion problem would be to assign (strictly positive) exogenous socialization
success shares25, but to leave endogenous the choices of DPIs. Even, by
25This would notably have the consequence that the ‘power’ of the parental socialization
18
Michael Pichler
setting the socialization success shares equal to one so that the children
are exclusively socialized by their parents, one could additionally eliminate
the strategic socialization interaction in the choices of DPIs (while as other
forms of strategic interaction could then still be introduced into the model).
Another alternative would obviously be to exogenously fix the chosen DPIs
of the parents while as the decision of their socialization success shares is left
endogenous (as in Bisin and Topa [5] and Panebianco [36]). This approach
would also additionally eliminate the strategic socialization interaction26.
The double effect of reducing the dimensionality of the parents’ decision
problems as well as doing away with the strategic socialization interaction
could furthermore be achieved by considering a naive socialization frame-
work where the adults (parents) fully neglect the children’s preference for-
mation process or are not aware of it27 — while this process is still taking
place. In such a setting, one would again have to assign (exogenous) parental
socialization success shares28. Notably, in the competitive socio–economy
version of such a model, all adults would always choose to behave exactly
in accordance with their adopted PI. This follows since the parents would
lack the behavior shifting incentives that would be created by the presence
of a (non–constantly zero) inter–generational utility component. Thus, one
would typically aim at giving additional substance to such a framework, e.g.
by introducing alternative forms of strategic interaction, or by considering
a social planner problem (as discussed below).
Finally, one could eliminate the strategic interaction in the decision prob-
lems by basing these on the parents’ expectations of the average DPI of the
general social environment (which would sensibly be based on the average
DPI that the adults have observed in their child period). The drawback of
this approach would be that one could not allow for the alteration of the
parents’ decisions upon observations of average DPIs that do deviate from
the expectations. Thus, on the transitory path, parents would generically
technique is being reduced in that the parents can no longer control the adopted PIs of
their children within the whole set of possible PIs. Rather, the sets of PIs that parents can
achieve for their children given their fixed (and non–equal one) socialization success shares
depend in this case on the location of the average DPI of the general social environment.
26A remark analogous to the one in the previous footnote applies here.
Also note that the latter approach would do away with the possibility of consistently
introducing into the model other forms of strategic interaction that depend on the DPIs,
respectively the underlying socio–economic choices of the adults.
27Parents would fully neglect the process if their inter–generational PIs would be zero.
In this case their inter–generational utility would be constantly zero (for all choices that
they have available). In the case where parents have an additional form of myopia and
are not aware of the PI formation process, they simply lack the inter–generational utility
component at all.
28In the simplest possible way, one could even assign to the parental socialization success
shares the value zero so that effectively, there is oblique socialization only. Thus, all
children of a society would adopt the same PI, which coincides with the average DPI of
the general social environment.
19
Michael Pichler
not choose best reply choices against the true realized average DPI of the
general social environment.
Social Planner Problem Given the closed circle between the adopted
PIs of the adults, their chosen DPIs (and underlying socio–economic actions)
and the induced adopted PIs and preferences of the next adult generation,
the cultural formation of preferences frameworks opens routes toward new
kinds of social planner problems.
To discuss these, let us first of all clarify possible ways how a social
planner could intervene in the cultural formation of preferences process.
The first way would be targeted directly at the ‘meta–level’ of the PIs, and
would primarily concern the social planner serving for an additional source
of child socialization, next to the family and the general social environment.
This could e.g. be in the form of the influence that the designs of the
legal system and the institutions (including schools and media) of a society
have in the socialization process of a child; see Bowles [11] for an overview
of related issues. Within the terminology of the present paper, the social
planner could thus effectively set a DPI coupled with (investments into) its
socialization success relative to the socialization successes of the family and
the general social environment29.
The second possible way of social planner intervention is only indirectly
targeted at the level of the PIs, and would concern ‘standard’ socio–economic
incentive shifting policies, like e.g. a consumption tax or pension schemes in
the context of first and third example in section 2. Since these measures are
designed such to influence the adults’ socio–economic decisions, the same
is being achieved in terms of the corresponding adults’ choices of DPIs —
which in turn influences the formation of the PIs of the children.
Let us now discuss the possible motivations of a social planner to actively
employ its socialization technique. The first motivation can result out of the
usual form of a benevolent social planner’s aim of maximizing the weighted
sum of the life–time utilities of a sequence of generations. Notably, since
the social planner is assumed to be aware of the inter–temporal externalities
that are inherent in the cultural formation of preferences process, she has,
via her two ways of intervention, access to a new level of efficiency: She can
inter–connect the question of the optimal inter–generational distribution of
utilities with the question of the optimal inter–generational distribution of
utility functions, since they are determined by the cultural formation of
29Let us shortly discuss the most simple ad–hoc formal representation of the ‘socializa-
tion technique of the social planner’. Assume that for every a˜ ∈ A˜ the social planner, g, can
choose (eventually child–specific) DPIs, φdga˜, within a choice set of possible DPIs (which we
leave unspecified here and which can, but does not have to, coincide with the set of possible
DPIs of the adults), and can determine its (eventually child–specific) socialization success
shares, σˆga˜, within an also unspecified subset of the unit interval. Then, its socialization
technique for child a˜ ∈ A˜ could be φa˜ = σˆga˜φ
d
ga˜ + (1− σˆga˜)
(
σˆaφ
d
a + (1− σˆa)φ
d
A
)
.
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preferences process.
The second motivation can be in terms of the social planner perceiving,
respectively having information about, a socially optimal (distribution of)
the PIs and/or DPIs within the society, which it aims at instilling in a
paternalistic way; see e.g. Qizilbash [39] for a discussion of related issues.
The typical question would then be whether the social planner can design
a transitory policy regime such as to achieve this form of social optimum in
the steady state.
Structure of the (initial) Adult Profile Triples Additionally to what
has already been said above, it could be of interest to characterize the prop-
erties of a specified model for different degrees of symmetry embodied in the
distribution of the (initial) adult profile triples on the adult set. Obviously,
the maximum symmetry would be achieved in the case of a representative
agent model, while as the minimum symmetry would correspond to assign-
ing any arbitrary distribution of (initial) adult profile triples on the adult
set.
As an intermediate step, one could partition the adult set into subsets
of adults that have identical (initial) adult profile triples. Thus, one would
obtain a discrete set of adult types, which could be interpreted as cultural
groups. Under suitable conditions that guarantee the inter–temporal PI sym-
metry of the members of the groups, one could then answer the question of
behavioral (DPI) and cultural (PI) assimilation of the groups30. Within the
present continuous preferences framework, this would constitute the ana-
logue to the analysis on the dynamics of the population distribution of dis-
crete preferences in the economics of cultural transmission of preferences
literature.
5 Conclusions
This paper has introduced a general representation of the formation of con-
tinuous preferences. We showed in the first main part of this paper (section
2) how children adopt preference intensities through social learning from
role models for preference intensities that they observe in their social en-
vironment. Thereby, we derived these role models, which we call displayed
preference intensities, from the socio–economic actions of adults. We then
showed how to interpret the preference intensities that adults have adopted
such as to construct and characterize preferences over displayed preference
intensities, respectively the underlying socio–economic actions. The rep-
resentation of the socialization process that this paper proposes thus con-
stitutes a consistent and closed circle between the socio–economic actions
30The author is currently working on such an analysis in a two cultural groups setting.
The work in progress of this paper, Pichler [37], is available upon request.
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taken by one adult generation and the preferences over these actions by the
succeeding adult generation.
In the second main part of the paper (section 3), we proposed one pos-
sible way to endogenize the cultural formation of preference process as re-
sulting out of purposeful parental socialization decisions. On the one hand,
these consist of the choice of a displayed preference intensity; and on the
other hand they consist on investments into the weight that this role model
has in the socialization process of the child relative to the weight that the
observed average displayed preference intensity of the general social envi-
ronment has. Thus, basically, the parents decision problem is to choose best
replies against this representative role model of the general social environ-
ment, subject to the location of the optimal preference intensity that they
would like their children to adopt.
We could show that, generically, whenever the average displayed prefer-
ence intensity of the general social environment does not coincide with the
optimal preference intensity, then parents countervail this suboptimal social-
ization influence on their children by choosing strictly positive socialization
instruments. This means first that they choose a displayed preference inten-
sity that deviates from their (utility maximal) adopted preference intensity
— and this deviation is into the opposite direction as the deviation of the
average displayed preference intensity from the optimal preference intensity;
and second, this behavioral countervailing is coupled with a strictly positive
choice of their relative socialization weight.
Furthermore, we could show that under certain conditions, parents use
their investments into their socialization instruments and the representative
role model of the general social environment as cultural substitutes. This
means that if the representative role model of the general social environ-
ment becomes more favorable (i.e. its distance to the optimal preference in-
tensity becomes smaller), then parents would reduce investments into both
socialization instruments.
Finally, we showed conditions under which a pure strategy Nash equilib-
rium of the ‘strategic socialization interaction game’ of the parents exists.
These equilibrium choices determine the inter–generational evolution of the
preference intensities and the preferences of the society.
The power of the model that is presented in the present paper arguably lies in
its generality which allows for a large number of possible forms of adoptions
and specifications such as to apply it to an accordingly large variety of differ-
ent socio–economic questions. In section 4, we also outlined lines along which
any such application could be oriented. But notably, these lines were embed-
ded within the basic structure of the present model, which is the formation
of continuous preferences in the socialization period of a person. However,
the very logic of the processes described stands in a natural relation to
models that are concerned with the formation/evolution/adaption/learning
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of any kind of preferences/attributes/opinions with continuous structure (in
the sense of the present paper) in the adult period of a person. Among oth-
ers, Friedkin and Johnson [23], Demarzo et al. [18], Brueckner and Smirnov
[13, 14] and Golub and Jackson [25, 26] provide for related analyses within
a social network structure.
Despite the generality of the model presented, there is however still con-
siderable room for further generalizations. Among other possible directions,
this would concern (a) considering an n–dimensional representation of the
formation of continuous preferences with an optional endogeneization of the
formation of the inter–generational preference intensities (although the lat-
ter extension would substantially increase the analytical complexity of the
model), (b) endogenously determining the formation of the construction
rules of parents, (c) consistently introducing ‘horizontal socialization’ and
the socialization influence of institutions (like the legal system, schools, me-
dia, etc.), (d) dropping the assumption of asexual reproduction and poten-
tially endogenizing the reproduction decision, (e) allowing for a pro–active
role of the children in the formation process of their preferences, and (f)
considering a representation of displayed preference intensities subject to
heterogeneous choice sets of socio–economic actions. Finally, instead of con-
sidering a continuum of adult decision makers, one could embed the en-
dogenous cultural formation of preferences framework in a finite population
setting.
A Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1 First note that since by Assumption 4, the target
functions of the parental optimization problems (2) are continuous and since
the choice sets are compact (Assumption 2), a non–empty set of maximizers,
i.e. parental best reply choices, must exist. Consider below any a ∈ A.
Case φdA 6= φˆa˜ (Ra): It will be sensible to start the proof of this case
by showing the second part first. Assume, by way of contradiction, that
sign
(
φa˜
(
φda (·) , σˆa (·) , φ
d
A
)
− φˆa˜ (Ra)
)
= − sign
(
φdA − φˆa˜ (Ra)
)
. For this
to hold, it would necessarily have to hold that sign
(
φda (·)− φˆa˜ (Ra)
)
=
− sign
(
φdA − φˆa˜ (Ra)
)
together with σˆa (·) > 0. But this can never be sub-
ject to a best reply choice, since e.g. the choice of (the same) φda = φ
d
a (·)
together with a σˆa < σˆa (·) such that sign
(
φa˜
(
φda (·) , σˆa, φ
d
A
)
− φˆa˜ (Ra)
)
= 0
would yield the same ‘own’ utility, but strictly larger inter–generational util-
ity as well as strictly lower socialization success share cost. Now assume
that sign
(
φa˜
(
φda (·) , σˆa (·) , φ
d
A
)
− φˆa˜ (Ra)
)
= 0, for which to hold it would
be necessary that sign
(
φda (·)− φˆa˜ (Ra)
)
∈
{
0,− sign
(
φdA − φˆa˜ (Ra)
)}
to-
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gether with σˆa (·) > 0. In this case, the slope of the inter–generational
utility function is zero, while the slope of the socialization success share
cost function is strictly positive. From this, it follows that there is al-
ways an alternative choice pair where φda = φ
d
a (·) and σˆa < σˆa (·), thus
sign
(
φa˜
(
φda (·) , σˆa, φ
d
A
)
− φˆa˜ (Ra)
)
= sign
(
φdA − φˆa˜ (Ra)
)
, but for which it
holds that the resulting reduction in the socialization success share cost
strictly dominates the inter–generational utility loss. It thus must hold that
sign
(
φa˜
(
φda (·) , σˆa (·) , φ
d
A
)
− φˆa˜ (Ra)
)
= sign
(
φdA − φˆa˜ (Ra)
)
.
We will now show the first part of the proof for the present case. Assume,
again by way of contradiction, that sign
(
φda (·)− φa
)
= sign
(
φdA − φˆa˜ (Ra)
)
and σˆa (·) ∈ [0, 1]. From above, we know that under the present assumption
sign
(
φda (·)− φa
)
= sign
(
φa˜
(
φda (·) , σˆa (·) , φ
d
A
)
− φˆa˜ (Ra)
)
. It then follows
that there always exists an alternative choice pair where σˆa = σˆa (·), and
where sign
(
φda − φa
)
= sign
(
φda (·)− φa
)
but
∣∣φda − φa∣∣ < ∣∣φda (·)− φa∣∣, and
sign
(
φa˜
(
φda, σˆa (·) , φ
d
A
)
− φˆa˜ (Ra)
)
= sign
(
φa˜
(
φda (·) , σˆa (·) , φ
d
A
)
− φˆa˜ (Ra)
)
but
∣∣∣φa˜ (φda, σˆa (·) , φdA)− φˆa˜ (Ra)∣∣∣ ≤ ∣∣∣φa˜ (φda (·) , σˆa (·) , φdA)− φˆa˜ (Ra)∣∣∣. Such
a choice yields (a) strictly larger ‘own’ utility, (b) larger inter–generational
utility and (c) less cost of achieving σˆa (·) given (a). Thus, the best replies
must satisfy sign
(
φda (·)− φa
)
∈
{
0,− sign
(
φdA − φˆa˜ (Ra)
)}
.
Assume next that sign
(
φda (·)− φa
)
= − sign
(
φdA − φˆa˜ (Ra)
)
and σˆa (·) =
0. But this can not be a best reply since the choice φda = φa and σˆa =
σˆa (·) = 0 would yield (a) strictly larger ‘own’ utility and (b) identical inter–
generational utility and identical socialization success share cost. Hence
sign
(
φda (·)− φa, σˆa (·)
)
∈
{
(0, 0), (0,+1),
(
− sign
(
φdA − φˆa˜ (Ra)
)
,+1
)}
.
Let us from now on consider the case where a choice pair that satis-
fies the third sign combination of above is available, i.e. the adopted PI
does not coincide with the relevant boundary of φd(X).31 We first rule out
that nevertheless sign
(
φda (·)− φa, σˆa (·)
)
= (0,+1). To see that this can
never be a best reply note that at such a choice, the slope of the ‘own’
utility function is zero. It then follows that there always exists a choice
pair where σˆa = σˆa (·), and where sign
(
φda − φa
)
= − sign
(
φdA − φˆa˜ (Ra)
)
,
sign
(
φa˜
(
φda, σˆa (·) , φ
d
A
)
− φˆa˜ (Ra)
)
= sign
(
φa˜
(
φda (·) , σˆa (·) , φ
d
A
)
− φˆa˜ (Ra)
)
but
∣∣∣φa˜ (φda, σˆa (·) , φdA)− φˆa˜ (Ra)∣∣∣ < ∣∣∣φa˜ (φda (·) , σˆa (·) , φdA)− φˆa˜ (Ra)∣∣∣, such
that the resulting strictly positive gain in inter–generational utility strictly
31In the other case, then the best replies satisfy sign
(
φda (·)− φa, σˆa (·)
)
∈
{(0, 0), (0,+1)}. To see that if φˆa˜ (Ra) ≥ φa and φ
d
A /∈
(
φa, φˆa˜ (Ra)
)
, or φˆa˜ (Ra) ≤ φa
and φdA /∈
(
φˆa˜ (Ra) , φa
)
, then the best replies must satisfy the second sign combination
follows basically the same line of argumentation as in the rest of the proof below.
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dominates the combined loss in ‘own’ utility and the increase in the social-
ization success share cost.
Finally, consider the cases where φˆa˜ (Ra) ≥ φa and φ
d
A /∈
(
φa, φˆa˜ (Ra)
)
,
or φˆa˜ (Ra) ≤ φa and φ
d
A /∈
(
φˆa˜ (Ra) , φa
)
.32 It rests to show that in these
cases sign
(
σˆa (·) , φ
d
a (·)− φa
)
= (0, 0) can not be subject to a best reply33.
To see this, note that at such a choice, both the slope of the socializa-
tion success share cost function and the slope of the ‘own’ utility func-
tion are zero. But this then again implies that there always exists an al-
ternative choice where sign
(
φda − φa, σˆa
)
=
(
− sign
(
φdA − φˆa˜ (Ra)
)
,+1
)
,
sign
(
φa˜
(
φda, σˆa, φ
d
A
)
− φˆa˜ (Ra)
)
= sign
(
φa˜
(
φda (·) , σˆa (·) , φ
d
A
)
− φˆa˜ (Ra)
)
,
but
∣∣∣φa˜ (φda, σˆa, φdA)− φˆa˜ (Ra)∣∣∣ < ∣∣∣φa˜ (φda (·) , σˆa (·) , φdA)− φˆa˜ (Ra)∣∣∣, and such
that the resulting strictly positive gain in inter–generational utility strictly
dominates the combined loss in ‘own’ utility and the increase in the social-
ization success share cost.
Case φdA = φˆa˜ (Ra): These best reply choices yield the maximum possible
net life–time utility.
Proof of Proposition 2 Denote the Lagrangean of the optimization
problem (2) of an adult a ∈ A as L
(
φda, σˆa
∣∣∣φdA, φˆa˜ (Ra) , φa, ia), which
we will abbreviate subsequently as L
(
φda, σˆa |·
)
. Any pair of best replies,(
φda (·) , σˆa (·)
)
must satisfy the first order conditions. Further, since we as-
sume that the optimization problem is strictly concave at this best reply
choice (so that the determinant of the Hessian matrix is strictly positive),
all conditions for the Implicit Function Theorem are satisfied.
We will now show that ∃ |ba| ∈ R++, such that if
∂2 L(φda(·),σˆa(·)|·)
∂|φda−φa| ∂ σˆa
> − |ba|
i.e. the two socialization instruments are ‘not too strong substitutes’ at the
parental best reply choice, then the desired signs of Proposition 2 hold.
To do this, we will transform the representation of the comparative stat-
ics matrix of Proposition 2 into a representation that involves only the sensi-
tivities of the best reply choices to the relevant parameters. For this, it will
be convenient to distinguish the cases where sign
(
φdA − φˆa˜ (Ra)
)
= +1/−1,
so that by Proposition 1, it generically holds that sign
(
φda (·)− φa
)
= −1/+1
(the other, ‘non–generic’, cases are disregarded in Proposition 2). Thus, for
the results in the first row of the matrix in Proposition 2 to hold, we require
that
sign

 ∂ φda (·)
∂
∣∣∣φdA − φˆa˜ (Ra)∣∣∣
∂ φda (·)
∂ ia

 = (−1/+ 1 − 1/+ 1) . (A.1)
32In the other cases, no further restriction of the signs is possible, so that we have that
sign
(
φda (·)− φa, σˆa (·)
)
∈
{(
− sign
(
φdA − φˆa˜ (Ra)
)
,+1
)
, (0, 0)
}
.
33Except for the special case φdA = φˆa˜ (Ra) = φa, see below.
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Next, note that
∣∣∣φdA − φˆa˜ (Ra)∣∣∣ = sign(φdA − φˆa˜ (Ra))(φdA − φˆa˜ (Ra)), so
that the entries of the first column of the matrix of Proposition 2 could
be decomposed accordingly. It is straightforward to show (by the Implicit
Function Theorem) that
sign
(
∂ φda (·)
∂ φˆa˜ (Ra)
,
∂ σˆa (·)
∂ φˆa˜ (Ra)
)′
= − sign
(
∂ φda (·)
∂ φdA
,
∂ σˆa (·)
∂ φdA
)′
and, thus, as far as the signs of the comparative statics are concerned, it is
irrelevant, how a marginal change in the absolute distance between φdA and
φˆa˜ (Ra) is ‘composed’, and we can restrict our attention to marginal changes
of φdA only. Thus, for (A.1) to hold, it is necessary that
sign

 ∂ φda(·)∂ φdA ∂ φda(·)∂ ia
∂ σˆa(·)
∂ φd
A
∂ σˆa(·)
∂ ia

 = ( −1/− 1 −1/+ 1
+1/− 1 +1/+ 1
)
. (A.2)
We can now use the Implicit Function Theorem to derive a necessary condi-
tion for these signs to hold. First note that since the Lagrangean is strictly
concave at the best reply choice, the second partial derivatives with respect
to the two decision variables are strictly negative, while as the cross second
partial derivative
∂2 L
(
φda (·) , σˆa(·) |·
)
∂ φda ∂ σˆa
=
∂2 iφˆa˜(Ra) (φa˜ (·))
∂ φ2a˜
σˆa(·)
(
φda (·)− φ
d
A
)
+
∂ iφˆa˜(Ra) (φa˜ (·))
∂ φa˜
−
−
∂ uφa
(
φda (·)
)
∂ φda
∂2 c
(
σˆa(·), ∂ u
φa
(
φda (·)
))
∂ uφa (φda) ∂ σˆa
is ambiguous in sign. It is furthermore straightforward to show that
sign

 ∂
2 L(φda(·),σˆa(·)|· )
∂ φda ∂ φ
d
A
∂2 L(φda(·),σˆa(·)|· )
∂ φda ∂ ia
∂2 L(φda(·),σˆa(·)|· )
∂ σˆa ∂ φ
d
A
∂2 L(φda(·),σˆa(·)|· )
∂ σˆa ∂ ia

 = ( −1/− 1 −1/+ 1
+1/− 1 +1/+ 1
)
.
Given these signs, it follows from the Implicit Function Theorem that (A.2)
is true if
∂2 L(φda(·),σˆa(·)|·)
∂ φda ∂ σˆa
< / > ba ∈ R++ /R−− where
ba = min /max

∂2 L(φda(·),σˆa(·)|·)
∂ σˆ2a
∂2 L(φda(·),σˆa(·)|·)
∂ φda ∂ φ
d
A
∂2 L(φda(·),σˆa(·)|·)
∂ σˆa ∂ φ
d
A
∂2 L(φda(·),σˆa(·)|·)
∂ σˆ2a
∂2 L(φda(·),σˆa(·)|·)
∂ φda ∂ ia
∂2 L(φda(·),σˆa(·)|·)
∂ σˆa ∂ ia
∂2 L(φda(·),σˆa(·)|·)
∂ φda
2
∂2 L(φda(·),σˆa(·)|·)
∂ σˆa ∂ φ
d
A
∂2 L(φda(·),σˆa(·)|·)
∂ φda ∂ φ
d
A
∂2 L(φda(·),σˆa(·)|·)
∂ φda
2
∂2 L(φda(·),σˆa(·)|·)
∂ σˆa ∂ ia
∂2 L(φda(·),σˆa(·)|·)
∂ φda ∂ ia


Remembering that sign
(
φda (·)− φa
)
= −1/+1, this condition is equivalent
to requiring that
∂2 L(φda(·),σˆa(·)|·)
∂|φda−φa| ∂ σˆa
> − |ba|.
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B Dynamics under Imperfect Empathy
In this section, we will derive the qualitative properties of the dynamic
evolution of the PIs under the first (imperfect empathy) type of construction
rules of section 3.1. To do so, it will be useful to first introduce the following
terminology.
Definition 3 (PI Assimilation). Consider any two succeeding periods and
let φm := maxa∈A φa, φm := mina∈A φa, and φ˜
m := maxa˜∈A˜ φa˜, φ˜m :=
mina˜∈A˜ φa˜. Then, we speak of PI assimilation if φm < φ˜m < φ˜
m < φm.
Definition 4 (Symmetric PI Point). Call a tuple {φa}a∈A a symmetric PI
point if ∀ (a, a′) ∈ A2 φa = φa′.
Definition 5 (Steady State). Call a tuple {φa, φa˜}a∈A a steady state if for
almost all a ∈ A φa˜ = φa.
Finally, let
{
φ0a
}
a∈A
denote the tuple of initial PIs of the adults.
Proposition 4 (Dynamics under Imperfect Empathy). Let Assumptions
1—3 hold, let φˆa˜ be continuous for every a ∈ A, and let Ra = {a} and
φˆa˜ ({a}) = φa hold in any period and for every a ∈ A. Then, ∀
{
φ0a, ia
}
a∈A
∈(
con φd(X)× R+
)A
, it holds that (a) for every two succeeding periods, the
PIs are assimilating almost surely, thus (b) the PIs converge to a symmetric
PI point, and (c) any symmetric PI point is a steady state.
Proof. Consider any period and any {φa, ia}a∈A ∈
(
con φd(X)× R+
)A
. Let
am := {a ∈ A |φa = φ
m } and am := {a ∈ A |φa = φm }. Assume that φ
m −
φm > 0 and further that λ (A\a
m) > 0 and λ (A\am) > 0.
First, we will show that in Nash equilibrium φd
∗
A ∈ (φm, φ
m). To see this
consider the parental best replies to φdA ≥ φ
m. From Proposition 1 (a), it
follows that in this case ∀a ∈ am, φda(·) ≤ φ
m and ∀a′ ∈ A\am, φd
a
′ (·) < φm.
Since in any Nash equilibrium, almost all adults choose best reply strategies
(see Definition 2), and since λ (A\am) > 0, it then follows that φd
∗
A < φ
m
must hold. By the same logic, φd
∗
A > φm.
For the next step, let us denote with AN the set of adults that choose best
reply strategies in the Nash equilibrium of a given period (where λ
(
AN
)
=
1). Again by Proposition 1 (a), it follows that for every a ∈ AN such that
φa ∈
(
φd
∗
A , φ
m
]
it must hold that φa˜
(
φd
∗
a , σˆ
∗
a, φ
d∗
A
)
∈
(
φd
∗
A , φa
)
, and for every
a ∈ AN such that φa ∈
[
φm, φ
d∗
A
)
, we have φa˜
(
φd
∗
a , σˆ
∗
a, φ
d∗
A
)
∈
(
φa, φ
d∗
A
)
. It
follows that φm < mina∈AN φa˜
(
φd
∗
a , σˆ
∗
a, φ
d∗
A
)
< maxa∈AN φa˜
(
φd
∗
a , σˆ
∗
a, φ
d∗
A
)
<
φm. Thus, φm < φ˜m < φ˜
m < φm almost surely.
Since for any two succeeding periods the PIs assimilate almost surely for
any tuple of pairs of (first period) PIs and inter–generational PIs, it follows
that for any tuple of initial PIs coupled with any tuple of inter–generational
PIs, the PIs converge to a symmetric PI point.
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We will finally show that indeed any symmetric PI point is a steady state.
Consider any symmetric PI point and denote the identical PI of the adults
as φ ∈ con φd(X). We will show first that φd
∗
A = φ. To see this, simply
note that by Proposition 1 (a) the best replies to the cases where φdA <> φ
must satisfy that ∀a ∈ A, φda(·) >< φa = φ. Thus, only the case φ
d
A = φ
can be supported by best replies (of the adults of AN ). Given φd
∗
A = φ it
then follows from Proposition 1 (b) that ∀a ∈ AN ,
(
φd
∗
a , σˆ
∗
a
)
= (φ, 0) and
φa˜ (φ, 0, φ) = φ.
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